

1964

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

11339

be done. This principle has been used in connection with good causes and bad ones. But it is this magic leadership, this call beyond a limited day-to-day material infighting, that can bring progress out of stagnation. Germany from defeat and from the economic depression of 1933 became something terrible, but strong, in 1939. England arose to a cause with the leadership of Churchill. Compare France of De Gaulle with the floundering postwar pre-De Gaulle France. Many Brazilians in 1960 and 1961 saw that needed leadership in Quadros, overwhelmingly elected to provide a stern and moral government, after pledging that sacrifices would be required of all. He cut out cockfights and bathing beauty contests, limited horseracing to Sundays, and made it mandatory for bureaucrats to put in their full hours of work. Are some of these details trivial, or are they significant? Brazil's present troubles are attributable to his resignation after 7 months in office.

The vitality required for progress cannot be supplied by foreign aid. Once that vitality is expressing itself under dynamic leadership, such aid can be helpful.

It is at this point that we should again remind ourselves that it is dangerous to devote the major share of our attention to the byproducts of a strong civilization; our major attention should be devoted to the spirit which makes a society strong.

History has demonstrated again and again that nations whose primary attention has been focused on the spirit have built up strong moral fibers. The cherishing of spiritual and moral values for their own sake has often been accompanied by such outward manifestations as well-being. The danger comes when a society becomes so attracted by the byproducts that it puts byproducts, such as well-being, ahead of its interest in moral values for their own sake.

The point can perhaps be illustrated by the example of man's search for happiness. The man who has some well-loved goal will experience happiness when he makes steps in the direction of his goal. He is getting happiness as a byproduct. Were he to forget this nature of happiness, and start on a pursuit of happiness for its own sake, his pursuit would not be successful.

Societies characterized by the spirit I have described, possessed of this desire to sacrifice for a cause which is almost a passion, have advanced regardless of handicaps. But, unless the cause be united with metaphysical truth, the advance can be short lived.

We might again recall what motivated the founders of universities which flourish in our country today. Pioneers in a new world, who were at work earning a living for themselves and their families, resolved to contribute of their time and income to establish institutions which, they resolved, would preserve God's word and pass it on to future generations. Concerned about their offspring they had the wisdom to know that the primary function of education was something greater than fostering material progress.

One of the messages which is clearly emphasized in the Old Testament is this one. When the main attention became shifted to the byproduct and away from the original strengthening spirit, civilizations become weak. When leaders, regardless of their practical education, flouted much of the moral law, and their followers did the same, weaknesses developed and civilizations fell; and no amount of attention to material things could cure a condition of fundamental weakness.

As I have mentioned, education is assigned an important part to play in the alliance and this is a very good thing. In the Charter of Punta del Este we find it written that "the primary aim of education is the overall development of each human being." I know that all of us appreciate that the attainment

of the overall development of each human being is impossible unless attention is given to the deepest and most significant aspect of that development.

Charity and the redistribution of assets on a humanitarian basis are not in themselves enough, particularly if such steps are simply inspired by motives of self-preservation. These and other steps must be the byproducts of a great spirit which has as its basis love of the word of God.

History has shown that neither will our country, nor any country allied with us, progress in any meaningful way if the bulk of our attention is so fully focused on the byproducts of greatness that we ignore the fundamental spirit which makes for true strength. This lesson, I feel, should not be ignored as 20 nations, including our own, strive to make a success out of the Alliance for Progress.

FRANCE AND AMERICA ON VIETNAM

Mr. McCARTHY. Madam President, the Washington Post is publishing a series of articles written by Walter Lippmann, based upon Mr. Lippmann's recent trip to Europe.

The third in this series entitled "Europe in the Spring," was published in the Washington Post on May 21, and the third section is entitled "France and America in Asia."

Mr. Lippmann makes a number of interesting observations with regard to American-French relationships, particularly as the relationships meet in an attempt to advance toward a solution of the problems in southeast Asia.

I should like to note two observations made by Mr. Lippmann in this article, to which I believe all Senators should be attentive:

There are, to be sure, reports that the general takes no one into his confidence and that he conducts foreign policy in solitary secrecy. This is simply not true for the major foreign policies. For example, French policy concerned with Germany, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union, with NATO and U.S. military and political leadership in Europe, involves the government, not just the general himself. The complex of problems which are connected with France's reentry into the Far East are not the sole and secret domain of the general.

Later in the article, Mr. Lippmann states:

After my conversations in Paris I think I am entitled to say that the French see a stronger resistance as necessary to the negotiations they are beginning to open up.

This was with reference to southeast Asia.

Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to have the entire article by Mr. Lippmann printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, May 21, 1964]
"EUROPE IN THE SPRING," III—FRANCE AND AMERICA IN ASIA

(By Walter Lippmann)

Although I did not see General de Gaulle, who was in the hospital when I was in Paris, I saw a number of key men who were in a position to discuss French policy. There are, to be sure, reports that the General takes no one into his confidence and that he conducts foreign policy in solitary secrecy. This is simply not true for the major foreign

policies. For example, French policy concerned with Germany, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union with NATO and United States military and political leadership in Europe, involves the government, not just the general himself. The complex of problems which are connected with France's reentry into the Far East are not the sole and secret domain of the General.

The more I heard in Paris, the more evident it became to me that far from being arbitrary, personal gestures, the major French policies are widely prepared, long-range diplomatic operations.

In dealing with France today we are dealing with very serious, highly professional diplomats, with men who are every bit as serious and competent as we are ourselves.

We are missing the main point and we are stultifying our influence when we dismiss the French policies as not really serious, as expressions of personal pique or personal vanity on the part of General de Gaulle, as inspired by "anti-Americanism" and a wish to embarrass us. The truth is that there is a failure of communication between Paris and Washington. The diplomatic channels are clogged with mutual pride and prejudice, and the consequent lack of understanding is a serious matter which could be and must be corrected.

All are agreed that the critical Franco-American conflict is in China and southeast Asia. This is the raw point where American lives and honor are at stake, as they are not at stake in the current differences in Europe. The Gaullist administration is acutely aware of the extreme sensitiveness of the American people about their involvement in the Vietnamese war. To suppose that the Gaullist government is trying to thwart us and precipitate a disaster in southeast Asia is, I am entirely certain, malicious nonsense.

On the contrary, the main objective of French policy is to save southeast Asia from conquest by China and to avert a disaster which would affect the whole Western World in its dealings with Asia. Let us not blind ourselves by a prejudiced refusal to take seriously the French intervention in Asia.

The French, we must not forget, are the only Western nation qualified to intervene at the present time. The British are engaged in a semicolonial war with Indonesia about Malaysia. The Germans are pinned down in Europe and cannot, while they are partitioned, play the rule of a world power. We are at war. Only France among the Western powers has fully liquidated its military position in Asia and in Africa. Moreover, the prestige of France and French culture among the educated classes of China and southeast Asia is very high.

If General de Gaulle is right, as most surely he is, that there can never be a stabilized peace in south Asia unless it is supported by China, then it would be folly on our part not to hope that he will succeed in his diplomatic explorations in Peking. However, these explorations are just beginning, and nothing proceeds rapidly in the Orient.

What is the French hypothesis? It is that the Sino-Soviet conflict is very serious, so serious that it now poses great territorial issues, and therefore that Peking has a strong interest in stabilizing its southern frontier. The real questions are: What is the price of an agreement to stabilize it and what are the guarantees of such an agreement? This is what General de Gaulle has now to find out.

If we analyze the situation fully, we shall conclude, I believe, that French policy and American are not competitive in Asia but are in fact complementary. This is to say that what De Gaulle is trying to accomplish is the only conceivable solution of what is certainly an otherwise interminable military conflict. But it is to say also that what the United States is continuing to do, which is to

11340

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

May 22

sustain the resistance of the Saigon Government, is necessary to the success of the French action in Peiping and Hanoi. It is in this sense that the two policies are complementary. They would become fused into one policy if the administration adopted as its slogan a modification of Churchill's remark "We arm to parley" and said that "In Vietnam we fight to parley."

Standing alone, the United States has no credible policy for winning the war or for ending it. Once again, as in all our wars, we are fighting for victory without a practical political aim. As we can see in the dictated peace after the First World War, in our demand for unconditional surrender in the Second World War, in the calamitous march to the Yalu in the Korean war, it is the vice of our thinking that when we are engaged in a war we can imagine no satisfactory end to the war except the unconditional surrender of the enemy.

This is one of the main reasons why morale is so very bad in southeast Asia. We are supporting and promoting a cruel and nasty war that has no visible end. There is no light at the end of the tunnel. I have heard it said by people in Washington that we must fight on in South Vietnam for 10 or 20 years. That may sound stouthearted in Washington but it is a dismal prospect for the villagers of Vietnam. What we are offering the Vietnamese people is altogether demoralizing.

On the other hand, if Peiping and Hanoi are allowed to believe that all resistance will soon collapse in Saigon, the price of stabilization on a formula of neutralization is likely to be intolerably high. Like everyone else, if they see a chance of dictating a settlement, they won't negotiate it. It is necessary therefore to do what the President and Secretary McNamara are doing, which is to reinforce the resistance of the Saigon government.

After my conversations in Paris I think I am entitled to say that the French see a stronger resistance as necessary to the negotiations they are beginning to open up. But most surely they do not think that the reinforcements can be more than a shot in the arm, and I doubt whether any serious American thinks so either.

It must be said also, I believe, that a policy of stabilization in southeast Asia demands that the American power and presence in the South Pacific shall not be withdrawn when our troops withdraw from South Vietnam. On the contrary, we should strengthen our position in the South Pacific. We should be able to do this if we do not forget, as we have allowed ourselves to forget, that we are a sea and air power and must not involve ourselves in land wars on the Asian mainland.

Although I think that French and American action should be thought of as complementary, not as competitive, neither government can at the present time afford to say so. We cannot say so because we might undermine what little fighting morale there is in Saigon. The French cannot say so because they cannot negotiate in Peiping and at the same time give their blessing to our intervention. But nonetheless, today, as so often before in our history, France, and America have the same fundamental interests.

DE GAULLE ON VIETNAM

Mr. McCARTHY. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record an article entitled "De Gaulle on Vietnam," written by Ronald Steel and published in the magazine the Commonweal, of April 24, 1964, at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request by the Senator

from Minnesota? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. McCARTHY. While I do not entirely agree with the observations made by Mr. Steel in the article, I do believe he knows that, we, too, raise the same hard questions which he raises, and that we should give some attention to the answers which he proposes, or to the answers which we may ourselves propose as alternatives to his suggestions.

EXHIBIT 1

[From the Commonweal, Apr. 24, 1964]

NEUTRALIZE SOUTHEAST ASIA: DE GAULLE ON VIETNAM

(By Ronald Steel)

(Ronald Steel who has written on international affairs for a number of American journals, is the author of the recently published "The End of Alliance" (Viking).)

Charles de Gaulle's decision to recognize Peiping, coupled with his proposal to neutralize southeast Asia, has struck official Washington with the full force of an unrepentant heresy. France's action is variously described as having dealt a mortal blow to SEATO, NATO, CENTO, the Alliance for Progress, etc., opened the floodgates of Asia to the tide of communism, and/or subverted American diplomacy and with it our leadership of what John Foster Dulles used to call the free world. Curses and moans are the order of the day along the Potomac, where the administration, like a spinster at the marriage of her younger sister, is seething with resentment over what it considers another betrayal of its various grand designs by its favorite arch-villain.

Licking the wounds of its battered pride, the State Department has been consumed with indignation over the actions of That Man in Paris. But, as so often in the past, its arguments have a distressing—although by now expected—tendency to be more self-righteous than convincing. In the land of the diplomatic cliché, the most predictable phrasemaker is king. The rest of us, however, before joining in the Greek chorus over Gaullist perfidy, might for our own benefit take a dispassionate look at what De Gaulle has done in Asia, and what it is he hopes to accomplish.

First, he has recognized that the real Government of China is the one that has ruled the country from Peiping since 1949, and not the one that languishes in Formosa on subsidies provided by the American taxpayer. This stunning act of political adventurism follows a similar action taken by Her Majesty's Government many years ago. In all fairness should not the chant of Gaullist treachery be supplemented by a resounding chorus of "Perfidious Albion"? While the Democratic administration, although it has been in power for more than 3 years, has not shown the slightest intention of discarding an irrational China policy inherited from its predecessors, it blithely assumes that the Europeans must forever remain prisoners of our own China lobby. President Johnson may be afraid to admit that there is something lying between Korea and Pakistan that Washington's political maps don't show, but De Gaulle and Sir Alec are not obliged to put on the same blinkers.

Second, by establishing political ties with Peiping, De Gaulle has sought to open a dialog with China that to his mind offers the only way of stabilizing the West's disintegrating situation in southeast Asia. His position is quite simple: it rests upon the belief, as Couve de Murville recently explained, that "the United States is unlikely to do with 20,000 men what France was unable to do in 8 years with 200,000 men." De Gaulle is convinced that the United States is simply re-

peating France's tragic error by trying to impose a military solution upon what is essentially a political problem; that the war in Vietnam is not so much one of the Communist North against the "free" South, but a rebellion within South Vietnam itself against a government whose only source of support is the American money and weapons that stand behind it. Since the United States is considerably more interested in fighting the war against the Communist guerrillas than is the Saigon Government itself, the rebellion has turned into a second colonial war with America taking France's place in an effort to impose a friendly regime upon an increasingly hostile people.

Washington is not unaware of the political aspects of this struggle. It has read the manuals of Ho Chi Minh and Che Guevara, but unfortunately it is trying to apply their lesson in reverse. The newly ordained guerrilla warfare experts along the Potomac seem to believe that the present ruling junta in Saigon will win universal adoration if only the Vietnamese people can be shown that their generals have friends in Washington. Thus Secretary McNamara puts on his khaki shirt for a barnstorming tour of South Vietnam, jumping out of helicopters to kiss babies and reassure stunned peasants that the Pentagon stands four-square behind its man in Saigon. Like a small town mayor receiving the blessing of a touring Governor, General Khanh told newsmen, "We would make a good team." The Vietnamese no doubt thought so, too, but the lesson they drew from it may not be the one Washington intended. Treated to a parade of American officials come to embrace their generals, trained by white soldiers, and equipped by the United States to fight a war against their own rebels, might they not assume that this is our war and not theirs?

It is in the mire of this increasingly hopeless civil war that De Gaulle's proposals come like a draught of fresh air. The aims of Paris, despite its radically different approach, are not so very different from those of Washington. Both wish to stabilize southeast Asia and establish cohesive states which will have sufficient internal support to maintain their independence in the shadow of the Chinese colossus. They disagree totally, however, on methods: American officials are trying to achieve through force of arms what De Gaulle believes can be accomplished, if at all, only by an enlightened diplomacy. His judgment is based not only upon the bitter lesson of France's own colonial experience in Indochina, but upon the conviction that there can be no peace in Asia without China's acquiescence.

Despite France's extensive economic and cultural interests in Indochina, De Gaulle has let the United States have a relatively free hand in Vietnam. During the past few months, however, under the impact of the political disintegration in Saigon, the breakdown of the truce in Laos, and the edgings of a fearful Cambodia toward Peiping, he has decided that the need for a political solution has become desperate. Convinced that Washington is following a policy which will lead to the communization of all southeast Asia, De Gaulle is trying to salvage what he can before the war spreads to North Vietnam or until a pro-Communist coup topples the rightwing regime in Saigon. Rejecting the Pentagon's military blueprints as irrelevant to what is essentially a political struggle, he hopes to reach a settlement with China for a neutral southeast Asia from which Western influence will not be excluded.

What De Gaulle is proposing is not simply the neutralization of South Vietnam, but that of all southeast Asia beginning with South Vietnam—a neutralization guaranteed by the major powers. As he explained in his January 31 press conference announcing the restoration of diplomatic ties with Peiping:

1964

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

11341

"There is no political reality in Asia * * * which does not interest or touch China. Neither war nor peace is imaginable on this continent without China's becoming implicated. Thus, it is absolutely inconceivable that without her participation there can be any accord on the eventual neutrality of southeast Asia * * * a neutrality which, by definition, must be accepted by all, under international guarantee, and which would exclude armed agitation, supported by one side or the other, as well as outside intervention; a neutrality which seems to be, in the present situation, the only solution compatible with the peaceful life and progress of the people of the area."

While the administration finds such an effort fanciful, it publicly muses over the possibility of extending the war to North Vietnam. This rests upon the assumption that there is no civil war in the south, but only Communist aggression from the north—an aggression which can be halted by bombing cities and supply bases. The fact that intervention from North Vietnam has yet to be proved does not seem to diminish enthusiasm for this theory. But it is a policy so unrealistic that most officials in Washington privately admit it to be as futile as it is provocative. Not only would it fail to strike at the real source of Communist strength—which is not northern supply bases but a South Vietnamese population so hostile to its own government that it looks upon the Communist-led rebels as liberators—but would likely force China to come to Hanoi's aid in a ghastly repetition of the Korean war.

The administration is admittedly riding a tiger it does not know how to dismount. It has sunk billions of dollars into supporting a government which has already collapsed twice in the past few months. It has sent American soldiers to die in defense of an army which has no desire to win and does not know why it is fighting. It has helped compromise the uneasy truce in Laos and driven Cambodia to disassociate herself violently from the United States. And it has committed American prestige to an area where we have neither the power to impose a viable military settlement nor the flexibility to negotiate a political truce. With an election looming on the horizon the Johnson administration is highly vulnerable to Republican attack for its inept handling of foreign affairs, yet it is afraid to change course for fear that will only supply more ammunition to be used against it. It has become the prisoner of its own mistakes, and those of its predecessors, and it does not have the courage to face an embarrassing reality.

Trapped in a policy which even its advocates do not claim can lead to anything more than an armed stalemate, Washington sinks ever deeper into the bottomless pit of the Vietnamese civil war. Hypnotized by the military aspects of the struggle, it can see no other. Not only does it consider the possibility of extending the war to the north, it greets Senator MANSFIELD's proposal for neutralization as a stab in the back, and it excoriates De Gaulle for asking the question it dare not raise itself. Yet as Walter Lippmann, as well as Senator MANSFIELD and others, has pointed out, the only hope for stability in southeast Asia lies in the neutralization of the entire area under international guarantees. Only under such a neutralization can there be any possibility of creating independent governments with the internal strength and the popular support to resist Communist infiltration. There is no guarantee that neutralization will work and that the small states along China's frontier can forever resist the dominance of their powerful neighbor. Probably the best we can hope for is the transformation of Indochina into a kind of Finland—or Mexico. But the opposite is certainly true; that there can be no peace in Asia so long as Indochina is used as a military bastion by the great powers in their conduct of the cold war.

In our obsessive suspicion of Gaullist motives, it is easy to ignore that his efforts to neutralize southeast Asia through an agreement with China are very much to our own interests. If successful, his plan offers the one way by which we can disengage ourselves from what has become a disastrous overextension of our prestige and a misguided understanding of our own vital interests without becoming involved in a war against China or suffering a humiliating forced withdrawal. Perhaps De Gaulle will not be able to gain the neutralization of southeast Asia even with our support—the time is very late and our position has deteriorated very rapidly—but it is certain that he cannot do so if we insist on blocking the way. While the administration is right when it says France no longer has the power to decree a settlement in Indochina, it refuses to recognize that only a France with diplomatic ties to Peking can do for Washington what it is no longer capable of doing for itself.

Time is running out fast in South Vietnam. Without Washington's cooperation, De Gaulle does not have the leverage with which to hammer out a new Indochinese settlement. If his efforts fail we are likely to experience yet another coup in Saigon, this time by a neutralist regime which will order the Americans out and open direct negotiations which Ho Chi Minh to end the war and unify their divided country. In our enthusiasm for prosecuting the struggle against the Communist guerrillas we seem to have lost sight of the fact that no foreign power can win a civil war for a people who have turned against their own government and who look upon the government's friends as their enemies. The dangers of neutralization are considerable and its chances dubious; but the dangers of continuing a hopeless war are even greater, for an anti-American coup is the solution most guaranteed to humiliate the United States and to trigger a violent political reaction here at home. The administration thinks it can forestall a coup by vigilance in Saigon, but can it win a war the Vietnamese no longer want to fight? Washington is being offered a helping hand off the tiger. If it refuses to dismount, then we must all be prepared to go wherever the tiger may take us.

TRUTH-IN-LENDING BILL

Mr. ROBERTSON. Madam President, several days ago, the majority leader's office indicated the interest of the majority leader in early action on the Treasury and Post Office appropriation bill. I had an agreement with them that if on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday of next week the Senate did not meet until noon, I would schedule hearings for those days on this appropriation bill.

I scheduled hearings commencing at 10 o'clock on Monday, and at 9 o'clock on Tuesday, and for the remaining days.

At 9 o'clock on Tuesday we shall hear the Secretary of the Treasury who had appeared before the Finance Committee on Monday.

On Wednesday we shall hear congressional witnesses on the question of minting \$50 million of new silver dollars. On Thursday, we shall hear outside witnesses.

In the meantime, my dear friend the Senator from Florida [Mr. HOLLAND] came to me and said that he and his colleague the junior Senator from Florida [Mr. SMATHERS] had a joint resolution to authorize the preparation of a memento—a galvano—without any cost to the Federal Government, to celebrate

the 50th anniversary of the naval air station in Pensacola. The Senator stated that the House had passed that joint resolution without any objection and he felt that there would be no objection in the Senate to it, and asked if I would therefore give him a hearing before the Banking and Currency Committee.

I told him that there had been before that committee for 4 years, with over 4,000 pages of testimony, a highly controversial bill, S. 750, euphemistically called truth in lending; that all the financial institutions of the Nation were bitterly opposed to it; and that we had never been able to complete action on it, but that the Senator from Illinois [Mr. DOUGLAS] insisted that if there were to be another meeting of the committee it would have to be on his bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Virginia has expired.

Mr. ROBERTSON. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for 3 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. ROBERTSON. The Senator from Florida reported to me that the Senator from Illinois [Mr. DOUGLAS] had agreed that I might call a meeting of the committee on the bill of the Senator from Florida in executive session for 9 o'clock next Monday morning.

Today I received a very bitter if not insulting letter from the Senator from Illinois [Mr. DOUGLAS], repudiating 100 percent what I understood from the Senator from Florida [Mr. HOLLAND] the Senator from Illinois [Mr. DOUGLAS] had said. What they said is between them. I acted on what the Senator from Florida [Mr. HOLLAND] told me. But the Senator from Illinois [Mr. DOUGLAS] repudiated that 100 percent and put me on notice that I had been very unfair to him and that he was not going to stand for that treatment any longer, that when the committee met next Monday at 9 o'clock, he would insist that I take up his bill S. 750, the so-called truth-in-lending bill.

Madam President, the members of the Banking and Currency Committee know that we never have gotten any Federal agency to endorse a bill without amendments. The bill states that it is to be administered by the Federal Reserve Board. The Board refused to take it under any circumstances. The patrons said later, "Turn it over to the Federal Trade Commission." The Commission asked for about nine pages of amendments before they would agree to handle it. There has not been a time since the debate on the civil rights bill began when we would have had more than an hour and a half to consider the bill and that would not even cover one amendment.

Consequently, there have been no more meetings of the committee because the Senator from Illinois insisted that when the committee met it had to act on his bill. It would require days to discuss that bill and vote on all the amendments.

I was shocked, when I had called this meeting on two noncontroversial bills, to

11342

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

May 22

find that the Senator from Illinois not only repudiated what the Senator from Florida had said about his having no objection to the meeting, but he charged me, as I understand it, with violating a promise which I had made to the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK] on giving the Senator from Pennsylvania due notice of what would be in the bill before executive sessions.

Think of it, Madam President. Here is a bill to let the Government issue a little memento to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the naval air station in Pensacola, and another bill introduced by the distinguished Senator from New Hampshire, a companion bill to one which was unanimously passed by the House, to authorize national banks to make slightly larger loans on forest tracts.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has again expired.

Mr. ROBERTSON. Madam President, I ask for 1 more minute.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. ROBERTSON. I asked that the committee be polled on the forest tract bill, if we could not have a meeting. Every member of the committee in that poll agreed to the bill except Senators DOUGLAS and CLARK. They did not indicate that they were against the bill. They stated that they did not want anything to come out of the committee unless the truth-in-lending bill came out first.

Now the Senator from Illinois [Mr. DOUGLAS] has said, as I understand it, that I have violated my agreement with the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK] as to the notice he would get on the forest bill, and that he did not get enough notice.

I announce that there will be no meeting of the Banking and Currency Committee at 9 a.m. next Monday, on anything. From present indications, when the committee meets again, it will be on the Douglas bill, and that will not be at any time soon, because we cannot meet on that bill until we have time to consider carefully the many amendments which have been proposed by the Federal Trade Commission and others.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Madam President, may I ask the chairman a question?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Virginia has again expired.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I ask unanimous consent that I may procede for 1 minute for that purpose.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Does this mean that the subcommittees will not be permitted to meet?

Mr. ROBERTSON. No. The Production and Stabilization Subcommittee has met on the truth-in-lending bill for 4 years, and it could not get it out of the subcommittee. Finally the bill was voted out of the subcommittee by one vote, and the Senator who cast that vote said that if his amendment were not adopted by the full committee, he would vote against the bill in the full committee. That amendment has not been adopted.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I am not speaking about the Production and Stabilization Subcommittee. I am referring to a housing bill in the Housing Subcommittee.

Mr. ROBERTSON. That subcommittee can go ahead. There will be no full committee meeting next Monday.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

PERSONAL STATEMENT BY SENATOR DOUGLAS

Mr. DOUGLAS subsequently said: Mr. President, I rise to a question of personal privilege occasioned by some rather extraordinary remarks which the junior Senator from Virginia [Mr. ROBERTSON] made about me earlier today.

The Senator made those remarks without notifying me in advance of what he was going to say. My secretaries report they did not receive any such warning. Half an hour ago I telephoned his office to inform him that I was going to reply to the remarks he had made. But he has not appeared on the floor and I cannot wait longer.

I have tried to accord to him the proper courtesies which, for some reason or other, he did not accord to me. The Senator from Virginia stated that I had written him a "bitter, if not insulting letter," which also repudiated an alleged agreement which I had with the Senator from Florida [Mr. HOLLAND].

In order that Senators may know whether or not the statement of the Senator from Virginia is correct, I ask unanimous consent that the letter which I addressed to Senator ROBERTSON on yesterday be printed at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

MAY 21, 1964.

Honorable A. WILLIS ROBERTSON,
Chairman, Committee on Banking and Currency,
New Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C.

DEAR WILLIS: I was surprised to read in last Saturday's CONGRESSIONAL RECORD that you now blame the younger members of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee for the fact that the committee has not met during the last 5 weeks despite my repeated requests that the committee be convened to complete action on S. 750, the truth-in-lending bill which was reported favorably by the Production and Stabilization Subcommittee on March 16, 1964.

The CONGRESSIONAL RECORD on pages 10711 and 10712 contains the following colloquy:

"Mr. HUMPHREY. It does not, if I may say so respectfully to my beloved friend the Senator from Virginia. I hope that committees will adjust to their schedules so that they can meet in the early morning.

"One of the reasons why the Senate has been meeting at 10 a.m., instead of earlier, is to permit Senate committees to conduct their business in the early hours of the morning.

"It is also very beautiful in Washington in the early morning. I know that Senators enjoy the beauty of the early morning hours.

"Mr. ROBERTSON. I concur in that statement. In my earlier duck-hunting days I learned that the sun rises very beautifully, especially over one's quarry. I can stand 14 and 16 hour days, but in the Committee on Banking and Currency I have noticed that some of the younger members do not seem to

want to appear at 8 o'clock in the morning, for some reason or other, and the committee has been handicapped in meeting for that reason."

At the very least, this is an uncharitable reflection on the younger members of the Banking and Currency Committee. I find it incredible to believe that a majority of the members of this or any other committee would deliberately ignore a request of the committee chairman for a quorum to be present so that necessary committee business could be transacted.

I now understand that you have called an executive session for 9 a.m. Monday, May 25, of the full Banking and Currency Committee, to consider a resolution to design and manufacture a galvano, and a forest tract bill for commercial banks, which is being pushed by the American Bankers Association. As I have stated previously, I do not believe that the Committee can continue to be run in such a way as to favor those bills that the chairman personally favors and to hinder action on those bills which I and others in the committee may favor, but which the chairman opposes. The issue, as Senator CLARK so eloquently stated, is not the truth-in-lending bill or any other bill before the committee, but simply the question of fair committee procedure and adequate guidelines to insure that all members are treated equitably. Again, I must state that I do not believe that the committee can continue to operate in this fashion. We must adopt some minimum rules of procedure governing committee activity.

Finally, even though the rules of the committee do not require it, and even though you have expressed your implacable opposition to Senator CLARK's rule proposal which would require that all members of the committee be given adequate notice of any matter to be brought up for a vote in executive sessions, nevertheless, I feel it only proper and just to notify you now that next Monday I will move to report S. 750, the truth-in-lending bill, to the Senate.

With best wishes,

Faithfully yours,

PAUL H. DOUGLAS.

Mr. DOUGLAS. If one reads the letter, he will find not the slightest touch of either bitterness or insult in it. The Senator from Virginia and I have differed very sharply on the question of whether the Senator from Virginia, as chairman of the Committee on Banking and Currency, would call meetings of the committee to consider bills which were before it, or whether he would refuse to call such meetings, or, if he called the meetings, whether he was privileged to bring certain bills up for action, and refuse to bring other bills up for action.

It is a well-known fact that the Senator from Virginia is very much opposed to Senate bill 750, the truth-in-lending bill, which certain Senators, including myself, have been sponsoring for several years now.

Finally, we were able to get a meeting this spring after I had requested it on the 16th of March, at which meeting S. 750 was discussed for a half hour. Since then, I have repeatedly asked the Senator from Virginia if he would not call another meeting of the committee, and his reply always was that he was certain he could never get a quorum. In his colloquy with Senator HUMPHREY on Saturday last to which I refer in the body of my letter of, by implication he states that this is because some of the younger members do not want to ap-